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Abstract
Considerable research has been performed to develop leading indicators of safety
performance. We use value-focused thinking to understand the objectives and
evaluation measures that frame a particular safety-related decision within an
organization. These decisions are part of the safety culture. Our research partners
were two oil shipping companies; we surveyed crewmembers on their tankers to
evaluate performance in each decision objective on their vessel. We demonstrate that
measurements of the achievement of these objectives are related to future safety
performance and so provide leading indicators of safety.
Key words: Value-Focused Thinking, Risk Analysis, Applications: Transportation,
Organizational studies: Decision making
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1. Introduction
The Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef on March 24th, 1989 spilling an estimated
11 million gallons of crude oil into the Prince William Sound, Alaska. The clean-up costs
ran to $2.2 billion. The accident occurred when the third mate was left in charge of the
bridge and lost track of his location while steering out of the traffic lanes to avoid
icebergs. On June 8th, 1990, the Mega Borg released 5.1 million gallons of oil 60 nautical
miles from Galveston, Texas when there was an explosion and a subsequent fire in the
engine room. On November 28th, 2000, the Westchester lost power and ran aground,
dumping 567,000 gallons of crude oil into the Lower Mississippi. A major storm pushed
the Selendang Ayu onto a rocky shore on December 7th, 2004 in the Aleutian Islands
spilling 337,000 gallons of oil. On July 25th, 2008 a barge collided with a tanker in the
Mississippi river spilling hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel oil.
Several large studies have been performed in Prince William Sound and San
Francisco Bay after such accidents, aimed at estimating the changes in risk caused by
proposed risk intervention measures (Merrick et al., 2000; Merrick et al., 2002; Merrick
et al., 2003). It is human nature to wonder whether there were signs warning of the
impending catastrophe. What happened in these organizations that allowed these
accidents to happen? What series of decisions were made?
Value-focused thinking (Keeney 1992) and multiple objective decision analysis
have been used in strategic decision making (Keeney & McDaniels 1992, Parnell et al.
1998, Phillips and Bana e Costa 2007, Simon et al. 2013) and structuring complex
decisions with many stakeholders (Phillips and Phillips 1993, Arvai et al. 2001, Gregory
et al. 2001, Keller et al. 2009, Keeney 2012). Merrick et al. (2005) used value focused
2

thinking to examine safety-related decisions at three different levels of the organizational
hierarchy in the oil transportation industry. Figure 1 includes a means-ends objectives
network (Keeney 1992) across the top that mirrors the accident event chain (Harrald et al.
1998). The fundamental objectives that comprise the crewmember, vessel, and
organization decision frames are then shown below their overall objective. Thus, the
network relates the objectives of the three safety-related decision contexts from Merrick
et al. (2005) in means-ends relationships. The three decision contexts are then linked to
the strategic objectives from the accident event chain; minimizing triggering incidents is
a means to minimizing near losses, which is a means to minimizing accidents, which is a
means to minimizing consequences.
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Objectives

Organization
Objectives

Improve
Individual
Safety Attitude

Improve
Shipboard
Safety Culture

Improve
Organizational
Safety Culture

Empowerment
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Individual
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Orientation
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Problem
Identification
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Of Safety
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Feedback

Communication

Formal
Learning System
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Minimize
Triggering
Incidents
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Near Losses
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Minimize
Consequences

Crew
Feedback

Figure 1. A means-ends objective network that relates our three decision contexts to
the accident event chain, along with the fundamental objectives for these decision
contexts.
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In this paper, we test whether performance on the objectives from the three
decision contexts (decision performance) is related to the strategic objective of
minimizing the number of accidents (safety performance). We use data from two industry
partners, a privately held energy transportation subsidiary of a large multinational
organization and a global energy transportation service provider, transporting crude oil,
petroleum products, and dry bulk commodities throughout the world.
We start in Section 2 with a review of the results of the value-focused thinking
sessions with one of the research partners described in Merrick et al. (2005) and the later
confirmation from the other research partner. In Section 3, we describe the hypotheses
we wish to test. Section 4 describes the surveys we administered with the crewmembers
of our two research partners. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the results of relating the decision
performance to safety performance. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.

2. Examining Safety Decisions with Value Focused Thinking
Flinn et al. (2000) review 18 studies examining safety culture and looking for leading
indicators of high levels of safety from the energy, chemical, transportation, and
construction industries. The 18 studies used a variety of techniques to search for leading
indicators, including literature review, focus groups, management discussions,
brainstorming sessions, and analysis of accident statistics. When the process involved
decision makers or experts in the industry, value focused thinking was not used to
improve the brainstorming (Keeney 2012).
Shafai-Sahrai (1971) examined 11 matched pairs of low and high injury rate
companies to identify common factors in low injury rate companies. Since this early
work, researchers have sought to identify factors in organizations that are associated with
4

high levels of safety performance (Cohen, 1977; Cohen & Cleveland, 1983; Chew, 1988;
Shannon et al., 1996; Shannon et al., 1997; Mearns et al., 2001a; Mearns et al., 2001b;
2003; DeJoy et al., 2004). Hopkins (2009) notes that many examples of safety indicators
are “failures of one kind or another.” These include failures that are close to the end of
the accident event chain in Figure 1, also known as precursors. They occur more
frequently, but are less harmful, than the events that they indicate (Corcoran 2004, Tamuz
2003). Our focus is not precursor events. We evaluate the decisions made in day-to-day
operations. We test whether the level of achievement of various objectives guiding these
decisions is related to safety performance. This approach is proactive as problems can be
diagnosed before any failures occur and improving the achievement of objectives is a
more positive frame for including the indicators in a continuous safety improvement
process (Mearns 2009). Specifically, it is clear which areas need improvement when the
level of achievement of objectives drops (Hale 2009).
A decision frame is the set of alternatives from which the decision maker is
choosing and objectives that govern that choice (Keeney 1992). There are three types of
objectives: means, fundamental, and strategic. A means objective is a means to achieve
another objective. A strategic objective is a long-term objective whose outcome can be
influenced by factors outside this decision frame. A fundamental objective is an objective
whose outcome is not influenced by factors outside this decision frame, but it is also not a
means to an end; it is the end objective for this decision frame. The terms means,
fundamental, and strategic apply to an objective within a decision frame. For example, an
objective may be a means objective within one decision frame and fundamental to
another decision frame. Similarly, an objective may be fundamental to one decision
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frame and strategic to another. Figure 1 shows the means-ends relationships across the
top of the diagram, but then shows the objectives that are fundamental for the three
different decision frames below their overall objective. Let us examine the process that
led to the development of these three decision frames and their fundamental objectives.
Merrick et al. (2005) discuss the results of a series of interviews with our first
Industry Partner using value-focused thinking. In 2005, Industry Partner 1 had
approximately 500 employees and operated 7 U.S. flag oil tankers and 2 tug escorts in
coastal U.S. waters. We held interviews with the senior leadership team, the health and
safety office, and a group of active crewmembers, including captains, engineers, mates,
and deck crew. Through the initial discussions, we identified the decision frames for each
of the interview groups. In 2006, Industry Partner 2 owned and operated an international
flag and U.S. flag fleet of 156 vessels, 117 of which were operating vessels and 39 of
which were under construction, aggregating 15.5 million deadweight tons. In 2008, it was
amongst the top five largest publicly traded oil tanker companies in the world, measured
by the size of its fleet. The company has nearly 4000 employees. We performed
objectives generation sessions with the same types of groups from Industry Partner 2 and
found the same decision frames.
The leadership team makes decisions that seek to make the whole organization as
safe as it can be. In this interview, we sought attributes of an organization with an
effective organizational safety culture. We considered an ideal organization and what
made it ideal from a safety perspective and then an organization that does everything
wrong with respect to safety. We considered various real organizations and discussed
what they do well, and what they do badly. We also considered regulations on an
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organization (or constraints), and what they told us about the minimal level of
performance in various attributes that are required by law.
The bridge crew interview concerned the attributes of an ideal vessel. We asked
them to consider that they were starting a rotation on a new vessel and what would give
them an impression of good safety performance. We considered what an ideal vessel
would look like and a crew and vessel that would lead the individual to ask immediately
for reassignment. We considered the good and bad vessels that they had served on and
crews that they had worked with. We considered regulations that make requirements both
on the vessel and on the crew as a whole.
The health and safety office makes decisions about training and certification of
individual crewmembers. In this interview, we sought attributes of an effective system for
preparing crew. We considered an ideal crewmember and a crewmember that you would
not keep on your crew. We considered actual cases where crewmembers were given
safety awards and others that were fired (but not by name). We also considered regulated
certification requirements for crewmembers and what these regulations say about the
minimal level of performance in various objectives that are required by law.
Thus from these three interviews groups, we identified three decision frames,
which can be thought of in simplistic terms as choosing the ideal organization, choosing
the ideal vessel, and choosing the ideal crewmember. The final set of fundamental
objectives for each of the three decision frames were found to be identical across our two
Industry Partners. In the organizational interviews, we identified four fundamental
objectives for the ideal organization decision frame:
•

O1 Hire Quality Personnel: Hire the highest quality personnel;
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•

O2 Safety Orientation: Ensure that new hires are fully oriented in the
organization’s safety expectations;

•

O3 Promotion of Safety: Ensure that safety is promoted at every opportunity (and
that the management team leads by example);

•

O4 Formal Learning System: Ensure that the organization has a highly effective
formal learning system.

In the bridge crew interviews, we developed five fundamental objectives for the ideal
vessel decision frame:
•

V1 Prioritization of Safety: Ensure that the crew prioritizes safety in all they do;

•

V2 Crew Responsibility: Ensure that the crew feels a personal responsibility for
safety;

•

V3 Problem Identification: Ensure that the crew identifies potential safety
problems;

•

V4 Communication: Ensure that the crew communicates well about safety issues;

•

V5 Crew Feedback: Ensure feedback to the whole crew about resolution of safety
problems.

In the safety management interviews, we identified four fundamental objectives for the
ideal crewmember decision frame:
•

C1 Empowerment: Ensure that each crewmember feels empowered to act on
safety concerns

•

C2 Individual Responsibility: Ensure that each crewmember feels responsible for
the resolution of safety problems

8

•

C3 Anonymous Reporting: Engender a no-blame culture so each crewmember
will anonymously report all safety problems

•

C4 Individual Feedback: Ensure that feedback is provided to all reported
problems.
Evidently, there are other possible objectives that are not fundamental to one of

the decision frames that we studied. Each of the decision makers makes a number of
more limited scope decisions in their daily work that are pieces of the wider decision
frame that we considered, but we sought to develop the broadest scope decision frame for
each group interviewed. This generated the most general fundamental objectives within
each decision frame.

3. Does Decision Performance Lead to Safety Performance?
Safety performance refers to the strategic objective to minimize accidents and other
unwanted events. For the purposes of this study, we define safety performance in terms of
minimizing the number of accidents on board each vessel in our research partners’ fleets.
An accident is “an undesired event that results in personal injury, damage or loss.
Accidents include loss of life or major injury to any person on board, the actual or
presumed loss of a ship, her abandonment or material damage to her; collision or
grounding, disablement, and also material damage caused by a ship. An accident can also
be an occurrence such as the collapse of lifting gear or a loss of cargo overboard, if the
occurrence could have caused serious injury or damage to the health of any person” (U.K.
Marine Accident Investigation Branch, 2005).
Decision performance refers to the performance on the objectives that decision
makers across an organization are attempting to achieve in the choices they make. In this
9

study, we define decision performance as the level of performance on the fundamental
objectives for the three decision contexts described in Section 2. This gives thirteen
fundamental objectives. We measure decision performance in our two research partners’
fleets.
We wish to test the relationship for each decision frame to find if any one decision
frame is sufficient as a leading indicator of safety performance and at what level of
organizational unit we should seek the strongest relationship.
o HO: The performance on the four fundamental objectives for the organizational
decision frame (O1-O4) is related to safety performance on the vessels of our two
research partners.
o HV: The performance on the five fundamental objectives for the vessel decision
frame (V1-V5) is related to safety performance on the vessels of our two research
partners.
o HC: The performance on the four fundamental objectives for the crew decision
frame (C1-C4) is related to safety performance on the vessels of our two research
partners.
Our general hypothesis is that decision performance is related to safety performance. We
test this on our research partners, thus the hypothesis that we test herein is specific to our
partners’ vessels.
o HVFT: The performance on the thirteen fundamental objectives is related to safety
performance on the vessels of our two research partners.
As a comparison to traditional precursor approaches, we also include a hypothesis about
precursor events.
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o HP: The occurrence of precursor events is related to safety performance on the
vessels of our two research partners.

4. Survey Design and Response
We developed questionnaires that our industry partners sent to employees of their
organizations to assess the performance on each objective. In this manner we could verify
the efficacy of the fundamental objectives and thus justify the effort to maintain the data
collection in the long-term for these attributes. To develop the survey questions, we
reviewed the research literature on safety culture, leading indicators, and general
organization theory. We determined multiple survey questions from the literature for each
fundamental objective. Each of the survey questions was termed as a statement and
responses were requested on a five-level Likert scale (Likert 1932) from 1. Strongly
Disagree to 5. Strongly Agree. In each case, the assertion was phrased so that agreeing
meant good performance on the objective. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the list of assertions for
each fundamental objective in the organizational decision frame, the vessel decision
frame, and the crewmember decision frame respectively. Each of the assertions in Tables
1 to 3 provides a slightly different interpretation of what it means to achieve the
corresponding objective. For instance, in Table 1 the objective “Ensure that the
organization has a highly effective formal learning system” has the following three
assertions:
d) This organization is very concerned about learning from accidents and near
losses.
e) My colleagues are willing to report accidents.
f) My colleagues are willing to report near losses.
11

As crewmembers rotate across different vessels in a fleet, e) and f) represent
organization-wide assertions. In the aviation industry, reporting accidents and near losses
(or near misses) are required by law. However, the maritime industry is only strictly
required to report accidents, so some near losses go unreported. Thus, f) is a higher level
of performance than e). Assertion d) is different again as it refers to learning from the
events rather than simply reporting them. As the different assertions imply a different
meaning to the objective, we do not want to follow the usual statistical analysis of survey
data by aggregating all assertions for a given objective using principal components
analysis. Instead, we keep each assertion as a potential definition of the objective.
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Table 1. Survey Assertions for the Fundamental Objectives in the Organizational
Decision Frame.
Objective
O1

Hire Quality
Personnel

Survey Assertion
a)
b)

O2

Safety
Orientation

c)

I have a high level of job satisfaction.

d)

Safety is a primary focus in hiring new personnel in this company.

e)

The individuals that are hired in this company are the best qualified individuals
for the job.

f)

My colleagues are enthusiastic in improving safety around the work place.

a)

I fully understand the health and safety procedures and instructions associated
with my job.
The training I had covered all the health and safety risks associated with the
work for which I am responsible.
Initial safety training is provided in this company at the earliest possible
opportunity.

b)
c)

O3

Promotion of
Safety

d)

I am clear about what my responsibilities are for health and safety.

e)

Training has given me a clear understanding of all those aspects of my job that
are critical to safety.

a)

Sufficient resources are available for health and safety in my organization.

b)

People can always get the equipment that is needed to meet my organization's
health and safety procedures, instructions, or rules.

c)

Top management is personally involved in safety activities on a routine basis.

d)

Personnel are actively encouraged to participate in initiatives that can improve
safety.
The company really cares about the health and safety of the people who work
here.

e)
f)

Management places a high priority on health and safety training.

g)

Corrective action is always taken when management is told about unsafe
practices.
I am satisfied with the recognition, praise and rewards given in this
organization for working safely.

h)

O4

Formal Learning
System

My colleagues consider safety issues seriously while performing their job
duties.
The hiring process in my organization is effective in identifying the right
people for jobs.

i)

Safety matters are given high priority in company meetings.

a)

Accident investigations are mainly used to identify faults in the system, rather
than to identify who is to blame.
Appropriate personnel are always given feedback on accidents and near losses
that occur in the organization.
I am encouraged by senior personnel to report any unsafe conditions I may
observe.
This organization is very concerned about learning from accidents and near
losses.

b)
c)
d)
e)

My colleagues are willing to report accidents.

f)

My colleagues are willing to report near losses.

g)

Information on recurring causes of accidents and near losses are effectively
disseminated to all appropriate personnel.
This organization is continually improving its mechanisms for learning about
safety.

h)
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Table 2. Survey Assertions for the Fundamental Objectives in the Vessel Decision
Frame.
Objective
V1

Prioritization of
Safety

Survey Assertion
a)
b)

V2

Crew
Responsibility

c)

Safety is the top priority when work is scheduled on this vessel.

a)

The crew perceives safety as a top priority while performing their duties.

b)

The crew is involved in informing management of important safety issues.

c)

The crew feels involved when health and safety procedures, instructions or
rules are developed or reviewed on this vessel.
The crew is accountable for reporting safety violations - actual or potential - on
this vessel.

d)
V3

V4

Problem
Identification

Communication

a)

I am encouraged to conduct job safety analyses and report unsafe conditions.

b)

All jobs have safety procedures, instructions or rules on my vessel.

c)

Whenever I see safety regulations being broken, I point it out.

d)

Vessel rules make it easy for me to identify procedures that are not safe.

a)

I am satisfied with the way I am kept informed about what takes place on my
ship.

b)

There is good communication on this vessel about safety issues.

c)

I am always informed about the outcome of shipboard meetings that address
health and safety.
The crew is kept informed about the company's safety policies, safety goals and
safety performance assessments.
The crew is always given feedback on accidents and near losses that occur on
this ship.

d)
e)

V5

Crew Feedback

Officers on this vessel would stop us from working due to safety concerns,
even if it meant losing money.
A consistent message that work pressures must not compromise safety is
communicated by the vessel management to the workforce.

f)

There is good communication at watch handover.

g)

The vessel crew is very effective in communicating safety information.

a)

The crew is always given feedback on accidents, near losses or injuries that
occur on board this vessel.
I am very satisfied with regard to follow-up and measures taken after accidents,
injuries, and near losses have taken place on this vessel.

b)
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Table 3. Survey Assertions for the Fundamental Objectives in the Crewmember
Decision Frame.
Objective
C1

C2

C3

Empowerment

Individual
Responsibility

Anonymous
Reporting

Survey Assertion
a)

I can influence health and safety performance on my vessel.

b)

I have a good control over the safety outcomes of my job.

c)

I am very satisfied with my involvement in safety on my vessel.

d)
e)

I feel involved when health and safety procedures, instructions or rules are
developed or reviewed.
I have fair opportunity to influence the decisions being made by my superiors.

a)

I perceive safety as a top priority while performing my duties.

b)

Whenever I see safety regulations being broken on this vessel, I point it out.

c)

I am involved in informing management of important safety issues.

d)
a)

I am accountable for reporting safety violations - actual or potential - on this
vessel.
An effective anonymous reporting system exists in our organization.

b)

My organization has a `no-blame culture'.

c)

Mistakes are corrected without punishment and are treated as a learning
opportunity on my vessel.
Employees are not reluctant to report a co-worker's failure.

d)
C4

Individual
Feedback

a)
b)

I am always given feedback on accidents, near losses, and injuries that occur on
board this vessel.
I am very satisfied with regard to follow-up and measures taken after accidents,
near losses and injuries have taken place.

With these two industry partners, 2170 individual shipboard safety factor surveys
were administered to the 89 tankers in the two research partners’ fleets between 2005 and
the beginning of 2006. From those, 915 individual shipboard responses were received, a
42.2% response rate. Note that each individual responded to the statements in Tables 1, 2,
and 3. Thus, they assessed their vessel’s performance on organizational, safety
management, and vessel objectives.
We received responses from personnel on 56 of the 89 tankers in the study, for a
61.25% coverage rate of tankers across the two industry partners. We received responses
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from 10 of 11 tankers in the fleet of Industry Partner 1, and 46 of the 56 tankers with
responses were from Industry Partner 2. The response rates for the surveys are
comparable to response rates reported by similar studies: 45% (Sexton et al. 2000), 10%
to 80% (Mearns et al., 2001b), and 48% to 100% (Havold 2005). Response rates for each
individual tanker varied from 27% to 100% of the crew, which corresponded to at least
six responses from each tanker for which we had responses. Table 4 shows the age and
experience of the responders to the surveys that provided this information. These
averages are not significantly different from the averages provided by each organization
at a 5% significance level. Thus we conclude that the survey responses provide a
representative sample.

Table 4. Demographics of the Survey Participants.
Variable

N

Min

Mean (Std Dev)

Max

Age

885

20

37.53 (9.27)

69

Experience in current employer

857

0

5.35 (5.74)

37

Experience in Industry

875

0

12.85 (8.57)

41

6. Safety Performance Models for Each Decision Frame
We will test the hypotheses HO, HV, and HC separately using a model that relates a set of
survey responses for a given decision frame at time t to a given strategic safety attribute
at time t + Δ , where Δ > 0 , or

(

)

Yi t +Δ = f X it,1 , X it,2 ,K , X it,ni + ε it +Δ ,
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where f is a n -dimensional function and ε it+Δ is an error term. In this case, Yi t is the
number of accidents for the i -th tanker in the year for which data was provided. The
numbers of accidents are not normally distributed, so a ln( y +1) transformation was used

(

to ensure that the residuals were normally distributed. The attributes X it,1 , X it,2 ,K , X it,ni

)

are the median responses on a survey question for the i -th tanker to aggregate the
opinion of each responding crewmember. Thus, we seek to determine whether the median
response on a vessel is related to safety performance.
In the timeline of data collection, the accident counts for each tanker were for the
calendar year 2006. However, the surveys were collected during mid-2005 for Industry
Partner 1 and at the end of 2005 and delivered at the beginning of 2006 for Industry
Partner 2. Thus while Δ > 0 , its exact value for each person responding varied. Thus
significant results here show that the attributes are in fact leading indicators, but the
precise length of that lead is not known. We received accident data for 32 of the 56
tankers with survey responses, including 9 tankers from Industry Partner 1 and 23 tankers
from Industry Partner 2. To test hypothesis HP, we obtained the number of near losses for
each vessel and include a model relating the number of near losses to the number of
accidents.

(

)

The form of f X it,1 , X it,2 , K , X it,ni is not known, thus we use stepwise regression
to determine the model for each decision frame. We included each first-order term as
well as all two-way interactions between terms in the stepwise procedure. We use a
forward stepwise regression maximizing the Bayesian Information Criterion as the
objective function. We then used a backwards stepwise regression starting with the model
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obtained in the forwards stepwise regression. The analysis was performed with JMP™
Pro version 10.0.2.
Table 5 compares the overall model statistics for each of the three decision frame
models and shows that the decision frame with the most significant model is the
organizational decision frame. However, each model of our indicator models are
significant, confirming hypotheses HO, HV, and HC. The precursor model is not
significant which does not confirm hypothesis HP and near losses only explain 4% of the
variation in accidents. Performance on the objectives of each decision frame is related to
safety performance on the vessels of our two research partners and each is more
significant than near losses. It is interesting to see which of the objectives led to
significant explanatory variables in each model.
Table 5. Stepped Model Results for each Decision Frame.
Model

Adjusted R2

Root Mean

F Ratio

Square Error

ANOVA

N

p-value

HO

0.7208

0.278

11.0051

<0.0001

32

HV

0.2789

0.447

4.9960

0.0067

32

HC

0.2679

0.450

4.7810

0.0082

32

HP

0.0391

0.5204

2.2220

0.1469

32

Let us now look in more detail at the relationships found in the model for each
decision frame. Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the effects tests for the explanatory variables
(objectives) for the three models. We show all interactions in bold in each table, along
with the main effects that are not included in an interaction term. Main effects that are
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included in an interaction term are not bold because they do not have a direct
interpretation separate to the interaction.
Table 6 shows two interactions and six main effects. Four of the main effects are
included because they are included in the interaction terms. The two main effects that are
not included in an interaction are two questions from the O3 Promotion of Safety
objective and each has a significant negative slope, showing that an improvement in these
responses leads to a decrease in the number of accidents. The parameters of the four main
effects that are part of the interaction terms can be misleading as some are positive. This
would indicate that an improvement in the responses leads to an increase in the number
of accidents. However, such main effects should only be considered as part of the
interaction.

Table 6. Effects tests for the explanatory variables in the organizational decision
frame model.
Objective
O1

O1

O4

O4

O3

O3

O1 * O4

O1 * O4

Question
HQP b)

HQP e)

FLS d)

FLS f)

PromS b)

The hiring process in my organization is effective in identifying the right
people for jobs
The individuals that are hired in this company are the best qualified
individuals for the job
This organization is very concerned about learning from accidents and near
losses

t Ratio

p-value

0.7338

4.77

<.0001

0.0144

0.11

0.9155

-3.1742

-4.72

<.0001

-0.2858

-2.05

0.0523

-0.5762

-5

<.0001

-1.0954

-3.18

0.0041

-2.7315

-4.32

0.0003

-0.8165

-4.18

0.0004

My colleagues are willing to report near losses
People can always get the equipment that is needed meet my
organization's health and safety procedures, instructions, or rules

PromS e)

The company really cares about the health and safety of the people who
work here

HQP b) * FLS d)

The hiring process in my organization is effective in identifying the right
people for jobs * This organization is very concerned about learning
from accidents and near losses

HQP e) * FLS f)

Estimate

The individuals that are hired in this company are the best qualified
individuals for the job * My colleagues are willing to report near losses
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The two interactions in Table 6 are between questions for the O1 Hiring Quality
Personnel objective and questions for the O4 Formal Learning System objective. For
each interaction, if the O1 Hiring Quality Personnel objective scores low, then improving
the O4 Formal Learning System responses can increase the number of accidents.
However, if the O1 Hiring Quality Personnel scores high, then improving the O4 Formal
Learning System responses has the desired effect and decreases the number of accidents.
Thus, from this model, we learn that a good formal learning system is only effective if the
organization hires quality personnel, but promotion of safety is effective on its own. O2
Safety Orientation is not found to be significant.
Table 7 shows that the stepped model for the vessel decision frame is one
interaction with its two included main effects. Again, interpreting the parameters for the
main effects is not as important as interpreting the parameters for the interaction, namely
that V5 vessel-level feedback is more effective if there is V4 good communication about
safety on the vessel. V1-V3 are not found to be significant.

Table 7. Effects tests for the explanatory variables in the vessel decision frame
model.
Question

Objective

Estimate

t Ratio

p-value

V4

Comm b)

There is good communication on this vessel about safety
issues

-1.676991

-2.33

0.0273

V5

Feed b)

I am very satisfied with regard to follow-up and measures
taken after accidents, injuries, and near losses have taken
place on this vessel

-0.5311

-2.4

0.0233

Comm b) * Feed b)

There is good communication on this vessel about safety
issues * I am very satisfied with regard to follow-up and
measures taken after accidents, injuries, and near losses
have taken place on this vessel

-3.26624

-3.14

0.0039

V4 * V5
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Table 8 shows that the stepped model for the crewmember decision frame is again
one interaction with its two included main effects. The interaction shows that C4
individual feedback is only effective if there is a good C3 anonymous reporting system
on the vessel. C1 and C2 are not found to be significant.

Table 8. Effects tests for the explanatory variables in the crewmember decision
frame model.
Objective

Question

C3

Anon a)

C4

Ind Feed b)

C3 * C4

Anon a) * Ind Feed b)

An effective anonymous reporting system exists in our organization
I am very satisfied with regard to follow-up and measures taken after
accidents, near losses and injuries have taken place
An effective anonymous reporting system exists in our
organization * I am very satisfied with regard to follow-up and
measures taken after accidents, near losses and injuries have
taken place

Estimate

t Ratio

p-value

0.4258

3.23

0.0032

-0.5173

-2.76

0.0101

-0.7718

-2.26

0.0321

In this section, we have examined the models and predictions for each decision
frame. The organizational decision frame provided the highest adjusted R2. However,
each of the decision frames provided significant models and factors. Thus, we should
examine each decision frame when developing objectives with value focused thinking.
None is enough on its own and none should be ignored. In each model, some objectives
within the decision frame were not found to be significant. This could be due to the
sample size and corresponding power of the significance tests, but this will not be known
without more data.

7. An overall model for safety performance
To develop an overall indicator set, we used stepwise regression to find an appropriate
model including all thirteen objectives. We again used stepwise regression, following the
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same procedures as for the decision frame models. The final model includes eight of the
thirteen objectives and four interactions. The model is statistically significant with an
ANOVA F ratio of 13.1058 and p-value of less than 0.0001. This confirms our overall
research hypothesis HVFT. The adjusted R2 for the model is 0.8111. The root mean square
error is 0.2286. Each of these model results are significantly better than any of those
obtained for a single decision frame. The residuals of the model are normally distributed
and did not show any indications of dependence.
Table 9 shows the parameter tests for each of the terms in the final model. Each of
the main effect terms in the organizational decision frame model is included in this
overall model, although only one of the two interactions appear here and one new
interaction is now included.

Table 9. Effects tests for the explanatory variables in overall model.
Objective

Question

Estimate

t Ratio

p-value

O1

HQP b)

The hiring process in my organization is effective in identifying
the right people for jobs

0.5949

4.85

<.0001

O1

HQP e)

The individuals that are hired in this company are the best qualified
individuals for the job

-0.0512

-0.45

0.6559

O4

FLS d)

This organization is very concerned about learning from accidents
and near losses

-2.8665

-6.04

<.0001

O4

FLS f)

My colleagues are willing to report near losses

0.2277

1.34

0.1937

V1

PromOS b)

-0.7184

-7.03

<.0001

V1

PromOS e)

-1.2459

-3.83

0.001

C1

Emp d)

I feel involved when health and safety procedures, instructions or
rules are developed or reviewed

-0.6678

-2.83

0.0104

C2

Ind Resp b)

Whenever I see safety regulations being broken on this vessel, I
point it out

1.3242

3.13

0.0053

C3

Anon d)

Employees are not reluctant to report a co-worker's failure

0.1482

1.68

0.1089

O1 * O4

HQP e) * FLS f)

-1.2692

-5.3

<.0001

O4 * O4

FLS d) * FLS f)

-2.7213

-5.03

<.0001

People can always get the equipment that is needed to meet my
organization's health and safety procedures, instructions, or
rules
The company really cares about the health and safety of the
people who work here

The individuals that are hired in this company are the best
qualified individuals for the job * My colleagues are willing to
report near losses
This organization is very concerned about learning from
accidents and near losses * My colleagues are willing to report
near losses
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The interaction between Hiring Quality Personnel and Formal Learning System is still
included. The new interaction is between two assertions for the Formal Learning System
objective. Specifically, this interaction shows that reporting near losses is only effective if
the organization learns from the events.
Interestingly, the terms for the model for the vessel decision frame and the terms
for the model for the crewmember decision frame are not the same here. In the vessel
decision frame model, there was an interaction between communication and crew-level
feedback. In the crewmember decision frame model, there was an interaction between
anonymous reporting and individual feedback. These effects appear to be explained in the
overall model by stronger interactions between hiring quality personnel and a formal
learning system. With these larger effects explained, smaller effects from the vessel and
crew decision frames become significant, namely empowerment, anonymous reporting,
and individual responsibility. Empowerment reduces the number of accidents as
expected. However, the significant anonymous reporting question is “Employees are not
reluctant to report a co-worker's failure” and the significant individual reporting question
is “Whenever I see safety regulations being broken on this vessel, I point it out”, both of
which increase the number of accidents, or at least the number of reported accidents.

8. Conclusions
We have demonstrated that value focused thinking can be used to find indicators of safety
performance using interviews, data collection, and surveys with our two research partner
organizations. Our demonstration involved 56 tankers and surveys completed by 915
crewmembers. Our final model related the survey responses in 2005 and the beginning of
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2006 to the number of accidents on board 32 tankers during 2006. We showed that each
decision frame provided a significant model, but organizational level objectives provided
the most significant model by a significant margin with an adjusted R2 of 0.7208
compared to the other decision frames with adjusted R2 of less than 0.3. However, each
of the decision frames is more effective than the traditional precursor approach, where
near losses alone were not a significant predictor of accidents and had an adjusted R2 of
0.0391. The best model comes when all three decision frames are included. The model
had a p-value of less than 0.0001 and an adjusted R2 of 0.8111.
As can be seen from Table 9, it is not as simple as attempting to improve just one
objective at a time. Considering the set of responses that would minimize the number of
accidents, hiring quality personnel and a formal learning system work together, but are
not as effective separately, so minimizing accidents was related to the following
assertions:
•

The individuals that are hired in this company are the best qualified individuals for
the job

•

My colleagues are willing to report near losses

•

This organization is very concerned about learning from accidents and near losses

Promotion of safety and empowerment are effective on their own, so we need positive
responses to
•

People can always get the equipment that is needed to meet my organization's health
and safety procedures, instructions or rules

•

The company really cares about the health and safety of the people who work here
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•

I feel involved when health and safety procedures, instructions or rules are developed
or reviewed

Two more questions were effective in predicting the number of accidents, so they are
leading indicators. However, positive responses on these two questions actually increases
the number of reported accidents:
•

Employees are not reluctant to report a co-worker's failure

•

Whenever I see safety regulations being broken on this vessel, I point it out

We should recognize here, that our true strategic objective is to minimize the number of
accidents, not just the reported accidents. So having all accidents reported is a critical part
of achieving the organizations’ strategic objectives.
It is important to note that the objectives developed are specific to these
organizations. This approach is not designed to generate leading indicators that are
generalizable, although we did find that the decision frames and objectives were
consistent across two oil shipping organizations. Our contribution is the approach, not the
specific product in our studies. Our results do show that value focused thinking provides
an effective framework for developing leading indicators. While an increased number of
precursor events, like near losses, are warnings of safety problems, we did not find them
to provide a statistically significant indicator in our data. Instead we examine operational
decision performance on a day-to-day basis and the leading indicators provide specific
directions for improvement to avoid future accidents.
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